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HORTON V. BROWNE, ILLUSTRATING CONFUSION
(LITERALLY) IN THE CIVIL CODE
Brian Flanagan ∗
I. BACKGOUND
In Horton v. Browne, 1 the plaintiffs, three siblings, sought
declaratory judgment recognizing them as owners of mineral
rights.
Initially, plaintiffs’ mother had full ownership of a 40 acre tract
in Red River Parish. In 1997, the mother executed a donation that
divided the land into three separate tracts, and gave each sibling
ownership of a particular tract. In the same donation, the mother
stated each sibling was to receive an undivided one third interest in
the minerals covering the entirety of the 40 acres. 2
In the following years, a series of transactions occurred. One
sibling was no longer involved after she sold her interest to another
sibling in 2002. In 2003, the remaining two siblings sold their
interest (collectively, the entirety of the 40 acres) to a third party,
reserving their mineral interests. 3 In 2004, the third party conveyed
her rights in the property (again, the surface of the 40 acres) to the
defendant, Donald O. Browne. In 2005, the siblings and Donald
Browne executed a mineral lease in favor of Pride Oil and Gas
Properties, Inc. 4 No wells were spud until 2010. 5
∗ J.D./D.C.L., 2013, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State
University. Special thanks to Professor Trahan for research suggestions and to
Professor Moréteau for support and editing.
1. Horton v. Browne, 47,253 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/29/12) 94 So. 3d 1034.
2. Id. at 1036. While the act of donation could have been more specific, it
arguably created a mineral servitude over the entirety of the 40 acres, and each
sibling received a one third interest in the mineral servitude. Id. Thus, each
sibling owned the surface of his particular tract, and a one third undivided
interest in the mineral servitude covering the entirety of the 40 acres.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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A dispute arose as to who owned the mineral rights at the time
the first well was spud in 2010. Defendant Donald Browne, the
owner of the surface, argued that the siblings’ mineral servitude
prescribed in 2007 for 10 years non-use, and therefore, he owned
the mineral rights. The plaintiffs contended that the original
donation by the mother failed to create a valid mineral servitude, or
alternatively, confusion occurred between their fractional interest
in the servitude and their rights in the surface. 6
II. DECISION OF THE COURT
The trial court ruled that the mother’s donation in 1997 created
a single servitude, which prescribed in 2007. 7 The court of appeal
affirmed the trial court’s ruling. 8
Article 66 of the Mineral Code provides, “[t]he owners of
several contiguous tracts of land may establish a single mineral
servitude in favor of one or more of them or of a third party.” 9
Plaintiffs argued that the article was inapplicable, as it refers to
“owners” and, at the time of the donation, the mother was the only
owner. The court of appeal, however, looked to the intent of the
mother, and determined that she intended to create a single mineral
servitude. 10 Further, the court found that “by agreeing to the terms
in the conveyance, each plaintiff intended to be subject to a
mineral servitude in favor of the others.” 11 The donations of the
surface and mineral rights were separate and distinct donations,
even though they were executed by means of the same
instrument. 12

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:66 (1974).
Horton v. Browne, 94 So. 3d at 1037.
Id.
Id.
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As to the confusion argument, the court ruled that confusion
did not occur with regard to the mineral servitude. 13 Article 27(2)
of the Mineral Code states, “a mineral servitude is extinguished by
confusion.” 14 However, the Mineral Code does not have specific
articles regarding confusion of mineral servitudes. Thus the court
applied by analogy the Civil Code articles regarding predial
servitudes. 15 The court cited Civil Code article 765, which states
that a predial servitude is extinguished by confusion “when the
dominant estate and servient estates are acquired in their entirety
by the same person.” 16
Applying this article by analogy, the court found that because
the landowner did not acquire the entirety of the dominant estate,
but rather only a fractional interest, the servitude was not
extinguished by confusion. 17 This was so because the rights were
unequal between the two estates; as a landowner in full ownership,
one would have an independent right for the exploration of
minerals, but as a co-owner of a mineral servitude, consent by all
of the co-owners was required for mineral operations on the
property. 18 Accordingly, defendant Donald Browne was declared

13. Id.
14. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:27(2) (2000).
15. A similar question was presented in Allied Chemical Corp. v. Dye, 441
So. 2d 776 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1983). The question was, “when a person has full
ownership of a contiguous tract and also a fractional mineral servitude in the
same land, are not the full ownership and servitude merged together and the
servitude extinguished by confusion?” The court in Allied Chemical Corp.
analogized former Civil Code article 805, an article on predial servitudes, which
required that the two estates be of equal quality for confusion to occur. The
court then found that full ownership and servitudes were not of equal quality,
and therefore confusion did not occur. Horton v. Browne, 94 So. 3d at 1038.
(Title IV of Book II of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, which formerly
contained art. 805 as cited by the court in Allied Chemical Corp. v. Dye, was
revised, amended, and reenacted by Acts 1977, No. 514, effective January 1,
1978.)
16. In this case, the dominant estate would be the mineral servitude, and the
servient estate would be the surface servitude. Id.
17. The court also cited Luther L. McDougal III, Louisiana Mineral
Servitudes, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1097, in support of the outcome.
18. Horton v. Browne, 94 So. 3d at 1038.
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the owner of the mineral rights to the 40 acres, as the mineral
servitude created in 1997 had prescribed for non-use in 2007.
III. COMMENTARY
The determination of when and to what extent confusion
occurs is nuanced. On confusion with respect to predial servitudes,
Professor Saul Litvinoff writes:
Confusion may take place only in part, as when the owner
of the dominant estate acquires only a part of the servient
estate the whole of which is burdened by the servitude, in
which case the servitude continues burdening the rest of the
servient estate if in doing so it affords any benefit to the
dominant estate. On the other hand, confusion does not take
place at all when the owner of the servient estate acquires a
part of the dominant estate, in which case the servitude
continues to exist in favor of the remaining part of the
dominant estate. 19
Horton illustrates this distinction by analogy to mineral
servitudes. Although each sibling owned the entirety of a particular
tract of land (the servient estate), the entirety of the mineral
servitude (the dominant estate) was not acquired by the same
person, as each sibling only had a fractional interest in the mineral
servitude. Therefore, based on analogy, the requirements of Civil
Code article 765 were not met, so confusion did not occur at all. 20
It is interesting to note that article 66 of the Mineral Code
provides an exception to this rule in that it allows owners of
several contiguous tracts of land to establish a single mineral
servitude in favor of one of them. 21 For example, if the three
siblings decided to create a mineral servitude in favor of one of the
19. SAUL LITVINOFF, 5 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE, OBLIGATIONS 64142, (2d ed., West 2001) (footnotes omitted). See also ATHANASSIOS N.
YIANNOPOULOS, 4 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE, PREDIAL SERVITUDES 453
(West 1983).
20. Horton v. Browne, 94 So. 3d at 1038.
21. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:66 (2000). The rule of Civil Code article 765
is also codified in Mineral Code article 27. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:27(2)
(2000).
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siblings, confusion would not extinguish the mineral servitude
burdening his particular tract, despite the fact that the dominant
estate and servient estate would be owned in their entirety by the
same person. 22
In a situation like the one in Horton, a challenge arises when
one of the landowners decides to sell but wants to reserve his
interest in the mineral rights. In this case, reserving the mineral
rights would only reserve the interest in the existing mineral
servitude. Of course, the prescription of non-use will accrue ten
years from the date it was created, not from the date of sale of the
land. 23 As a practical matter, the siblings could have partitioned the
mineral servitude. A partition would divide the servitude and result
in each sibling having full ownership of the land and mineral rights
in his particular tract. This would allow a sibling to create a new
mineral servitude from the date of sale of the land. Alternatively,
the siblings could have executed an acknowledgment of the
servitude, pursuant to Mineral Code article 54, which would have
extended the date of prescription for non-use. 24

22. See LA. REV.STAT. ANN. § 31:66 (2000) and LA. CIV. CODE art. 765.
23. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:28 (2000).
24. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:54 (2000).

